Abstract
This paper examines the causes and consequences of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war utilizing Waltz’s three levels of analysis, system, state and decision-makers. It first examines the causes, looking at why the MENA regional system, but particularly the Arab-Israeli subsystem, was so war prone; assessing why a certain bellicoseness was built into both Israel and several of its Arab neighbours; and assesses the calculations and miscalculations by leaders on both sides that led to war. 1967 was a “war of vulnerability" and miscalculation for Egypt but for Israel the war derived from a mix of vulnerability (from vulnerable borders) and opportunity (to acquire “defensible’ borders). The paper then examines why the 1967 war did not lead to peace, but rather to a chain of new wars. Victory in 1967 reinforced Israel’s territorial ambitions; shifted the power balance decisively toward it; and ultimately shattered Arab unity against it; but because the imbalance in Israel’s favour was insufficient to impose a pro-Israeli peace, the result was new wars in which Arab states sought to reverse and Israel to reinforce the verdict of 1967.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 593-609 |
| Journal | British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies |
| Volume | 44 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| Early online date | 6 Sept 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Sept 2017 |
Keywords
- War
- Arab-Israeli conflict
- IR theory
- Waltz
- Middle Eastern Studies
Access to Document
- Hinnebusch_2017_BJMES_Arab-IsraelWar_AAM
© 2017 British Society for Middle Eastern Studies. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created accepted version manuscript following peer review and as such may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at: https://doi.org/10.1080/13530194.2017.1360014
