Abstract
This chapter examines Aristotle’s rejection of a Platonist theory positing two principles: Form and the Great and Small. He complains that, under the latter, privation is not distinguished from the subject of coming to be. This chapter discusses the background for this dyadic theory in the Philebus and the Timaeus. It suggests that Aristotle’s opposition only makes sense if Platonists were proposing to extend it to cover comings to be such as biological reproduction. It also discusses whether, dialectically, Aristotle wins against Platonism within Physics I 9, and in the wider context of his biology. The chapter notes that when the explanandum is eternal motion, the triad of principles is useless, because there is no distinct principle of privation. So, Aristotle himself is chained to a Platonist-style dyadism. The chapter concludes by drawing a connection between this theory and Aristotle’s first mover as both final and efficient cause of eternal motion.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Aristotle's Physics alpha |
Subtitle of host publication | Symposium Aristotelicum |
Editors | Katerina Ierodiakonou, Paul Kalligas, Vassilis Karasmanis |
Place of Publication | Oxford |
Publisher | Oxford University Press |
Chapter | 10 |
Pages | 302-340 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9780191868948 |
ISBN (Print) | 9780198830993 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 6 Jun 2019 |
Event | Proceedings of the XIVth Symposium Aristotelicum - European Cultural Centre of Delphi, Delphi, Greece Duration: 26 Jul 2014 → 2 Aug 2014 https://www.ontology.co/biblio/ancient-symposia.htm |
Publication series
Name | Symposia Aristotelia |
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Conference
Conference | Proceedings of the XIVth Symposium Aristotelicum |
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Country/Territory | Greece |
City | Delphi |
Period | 26/07/14 → 2/08/14 |
Internet address |
Keywords
- Platonist dyadism
- The Great and Small
- Privation
- Subject of coming to be
- Final cause
- Exemplary cause
- Efficient cause