Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games

Jonathan Paul Thomas; M Cripps

Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games

Jonathan Paul Thomas, M Cripps

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

17 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium. (C) 1997 Academic Press.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	141-158
Number of pages	18
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	18
Issue number	2
Publication status	Published - Feb 1997

Keywords

SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
REPUTATION

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title = "Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games",

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AB - We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium. (C) 1997 Academic Press.

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KW - INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

KW - REPUTATION

M3 - Article

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SP - 141

EP - 158

JO - Games and Economic Behavior

JF - Games and Economic Behavior

IS - 2

ER -

Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games

Abstract

Keywords

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