Reputation and Perfection in Repeated Common Interest Games

Jonathan Paul Thomas, M Cripps

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    15 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We consider a wide class of repeated common interest games perturbed with one-sided incomplete information: one player (the informed player) might be a commitment type playing the Pareto dominant action. As discounting, which is assumed to be symmetric, and the prior probability of the commitment type go to zero, it is shown that the informed player can be held close to her minmax payoff even when perfection is imposed on the equilibrium. (C) 1997 Academic Press.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)141-158
    Number of pages18
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume18
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 1997

    Keywords

    • SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIUM
    • INCOMPLETE INFORMATION
    • REPUTATION

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