Reply to Sylvan: constructivism? – Not Kant, not I

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Kurt Sylvan’s generous discussion of my book, The Domain of Reasons, argues that its account of reason relations would be strengthened if I accepted some version of ‘Kantian constructivism;’ and that that would, moreover, bring me closer to Kant. I argue against both these claims. I do not agree that ‘Kantian constructivism,’ understood in its contemporary sense, would strengthen my account of normativity. Nor do I agree that adopting it would make me more Kantian. On the contrary, I believe my cognitivist but irrealist account is closer to Kant than is anything that could be called ‘constructivism’ about reason.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)593-605
Number of pages12
JournalThe Philosophical Quarterly
Issue number268
Early online date3 Nov 2016
Publication statusPublished - Jul 2017


  • Constructivism
  • Realism
  • Reasons
  • Kant


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