Abstract
This paper is a contribution to a book symposium on my book Experiencing Time. I reply to comments on the book by Natalja Deng, Geoffrey Lee and Bradford Skow. Although several chapters of the book are discussed, the main focus of my reply is on chapters 2 and 6. In chapter 2 I argue that the putative mind-independent passage of time could not be experienced, and from this I develop an argument against the A-theory of time. In chapter 6 I offer one part of an explanation of why we are disposed to think that time passes, relating to the supposedly ‘dynamic’ quality of experienced change. Deng, Lee, and Skow’s comments help me to clarify several issues, add some new thoughts, and make a new distinction that was needed, and I acknowledge, as I did in the book, that certain arguments in chapter 6 are not conclusive; but I otherwise concede very little regarding the main claims and arguments defended in the book.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 328-350 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | Inquiry - An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy |
| Volume | 61 |
| Issue number | 3 |
| Early online date | 5 Oct 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 |
Keywords
- Time
- Temporal Experience
- Passage of time
- Specious present
- A-theory
- B-theory
- Peception