Reflective Knowledge and Epistemic Circularity

C. S. I. Jenkins*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper examines the kind of epistemic circularity which, according to Ernest Sosa, is unavoidably entailed whenever one has what he calls 'reflective' knowledge (that is, knowledge that p such that the knower reflectively endorses the reliability of the epistemic sources by which she came to her belief that p). I begin by describing the relevant kind of circularity and its role in Sosa's epistemology, en route presenting and resisting Sosa's arguments that this kind of circularity is not vicious. Then I consider the somewhat complex relationship between Sosa's views on epistemic circularity and his response to the Problem of Easy Knowledge, arguing that (on one interpretation of Sosa, at least) a complete solution to that problem cannot be extracted from Sosa's work unless the aforementioned epistemic circularity can be proved non-vicious.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)305-325
Number of pages21
JournalPhilosophical Papers
Volume40
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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