Redistributing income under proportional representation: a correction

Massimo Morelli; Margherita Negri

doi:10.1086/700733

Redistributing income under proportional representation: a correction

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Abstract

Austen-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering the
workforce is suﬃciently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redistribution levels that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional representation systems (Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mistake. We explain the mistake and oﬀer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the original paper continues to hold.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	458-462
Number of pages	5
Journal	Journal of Political Economy
Volume	127
Issue number	1
Early online date	4 Jan 2019
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1086/700733
Publication status	Published - 1 Feb 2019

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10.1086/700733

Redistributing Income under Proportional Representation A Correction
Copyright © 2019, The University of Chicago. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi.org/10.1086/700733
Accepted author manuscript, 189 KB

Margherita Negri
- mn48st-andrews.acuk
- Economics (Business School) - Lecturer
Person: Academic

Cite this

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abstract = "Austen-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering theworkforce is suﬃciently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redistribution levels that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional representation systems (Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mistake. We explain the mistake and oﬀer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the original paper continues to hold.",

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Redistributing income under proportional representation: a correction

Abstract

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Margherita Negri

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