Reason Claims and Contrastivism about Reasons

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19 Citations (Scopus)


Contrastivism about reasons is the view that ‘reason’ expresses a relation with an argument place for a set of alternatives. This is in opposition to a more traditional theory on which reasons are reasons for things simpliciter. I argue that contrastivism provides a solution to a puzzle involving reason claims that explicitly employ ‘rather than’. Contrastivism solves the puzzle by allowing that some fact might be a reason for an action out of one set of alternatives without being a reason for that action out of a different set of alternatives.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)231-242
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number2
Early online date6 Oct 2012
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2013


  • Contrastivism
  • Reasons
  • Reason ascriptions
  • Practical reasoning


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