Abstract
This paper examines a form of talking about speech acts, mental states, and other features so far unexplored in philosophy: quotative be like. Quotative be like is the use of like and to be that occurs in constructions such as “Ellen was like“I’m leaving!”” We argue that neglect of quotative be like represents a gap in our understanding of our ways of characterizing the minds and speech of ourselves and others. Further, we show that quotative be like is not reducible to more familiar forms of direct discourse or indirect discourse. Mapping out a number of different options for theorizing about quotative be like, we argue for an account on which the quoted material in quotative be like picks out properties.
Original language | English |
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Article number | 21 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Synthese |
Volume | 205 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 6 Jan 2025 |
Keywords
- Quotative 'be like'
- Quotation
- Attitude reports
- Direct discourse
- Indirect discourse