Property identities and modal arguments

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Abstract

Many physicalists about the mind are committed to claims about property identities. Following Kripke's well-known discussion, modal arguments have emerged as major threats to such claims. This paper argues that modal arguments can be resisted by adopting a counterpart theoretic account of modal claims, and in particular modal claims involving properties. Thus physicalists have a powerful motive to adopt non-Kripkean accounts of the metaphysics of modality and the semantics of modal expressions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-19
JournalPhilosophers' Imprint
Volume11
Issue number13
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2011

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