Property division on divorce with inequity aversion

Ian Smith

doi:10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.006

Property division on divorce with inequity aversion

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

In the absence of transaction costs, the divorce decision is invariant to legal rules on post-divorce asset allocation. This article introduces a one-sided inequity aversion model to show that property division laws can have efficiency as well as distributive consequences. When divorce is a credible threat, aversion to inequity may prevent spouses renegotiating their marriage to avoid an inefficient marital dissolution. Contemporary trends towards greater equality in property division can be interpreted in terms of their beneficial efficiency effects in addition to standard distributive concerns. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	111-128
Number of pages	18
Journal	International Review of Law and Economics
Volume	27
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.006
Publication status	Published - Jun 2007

Keywords

property settlement
divorce
inequity aversion
NO-FAULT DIVORCE
UNILATERAL DIVORCE
ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS
MARRIAGE
LAW
FAMILY
FAIRNESS
SETTLEMENTS
PREFERENCES
COOPERATION

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10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.006

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title = "Property division on divorce with inequity aversion",

abstract = "In the absence of transaction costs, the divorce decision is invariant to legal rules on post-divorce asset allocation. This article introduces a one-sided inequity aversion model to show that property division laws can have efficiency as well as distributive consequences. When divorce is a credible threat, aversion to inequity may prevent spouses renegotiating their marriage to avoid an inefficient marital dissolution. Contemporary trends towards greater equality in property division can be interpreted in terms of their beneficial efficiency effects in addition to standard distributive concerns. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.",

keywords = "property settlement, divorce, inequity aversion, NO-FAULT DIVORCE, UNILATERAL DIVORCE, ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS, MARRIAGE, LAW, FAMILY, FAIRNESS, SETTLEMENTS, PREFERENCES, COOPERATION",

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PY - 2007/6

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AB - In the absence of transaction costs, the divorce decision is invariant to legal rules on post-divorce asset allocation. This article introduces a one-sided inequity aversion model to show that property division laws can have efficiency as well as distributive consequences. When divorce is a credible threat, aversion to inequity may prevent spouses renegotiating their marriage to avoid an inefficient marital dissolution. Contemporary trends towards greater equality in property division can be interpreted in terms of their beneficial efficiency effects in addition to standard distributive concerns. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

KW - property settlement

KW - divorce

KW - inequity aversion

KW - NO-FAULT DIVORCE

KW - UNILATERAL DIVORCE

KW - ECONOMIC-ANALYSIS

KW - MARRIAGE

KW - LAW

KW - FAMILY

KW - FAIRNESS

KW - SETTLEMENTS

KW - PREFERENCES

KW - COOPERATION

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DO - 10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.006

M3 - Article

SN - 0144-8188

VL - 27

SP - 111

EP - 128

JO - International Review of Law and Economics

JF - International Review of Law and Economics

IS - 2

ER -

Property division on divorce with inequity aversion

Abstract

Keywords

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