Proofs and models in naive property theory: a response to hartry field's ‘properties, propositions and conditionals’

Shawn Standefer, Rohan French, Greg Restall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

In our response Field's ‘Properties, Propositions and Conditionals’, we explore the methodology of Field's program. We begin by contrasting it with a proof-theoretic approach and then commenting on some of the particular choices made in the development of Field's theory. Then, we look at issues of property identity in connection with different notions of equivalence. We close with some comments relating our discussion to Field's response to Restall’s [2010] ‘What Are We to Accept, and What Are We to Reject, While Saving Truth from Paradox?’
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)162-177
Number of pages16
JournalAustralasian Philosophical Review
Volume4
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2 Apr 2020

Keywords

  • Non-classical logic
  • Paradoxes
  • Conditionals
  • Proof theory
  • Revision theory

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