Practical truth in Aristotle

Sarah Broadie

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

An interpretation is offered of the Aristotelian concept of “practical truth”
in the wake of Anscombe’s very interesting exegesis. Her own interpretation is
considered and its merits noted, but a question is raised as to its plausibility as an
account of what Aristotle himself intended in speaking of “truth that is practical”
(he alētheia praktikē).
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)281-298
Number of pages18
JournalAmerican Catholic Philosophical Quarterly
Volume90
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2016

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