Abstract
Phenomenal character (or feel) is the what-it's-likeness of subjective experience. I develop an ontology of phenomenal feel as process. My being in some phenomenal state R is the process of my instantiating R’s neurological correlate. The ontology explains why we have asymmetric epistemic access to phenomenal characters: the ontological ground for the subjective or first-personal stance is different from the ontological ground for the objective or third-personal stance. I end by situating my account in debates about physicalism.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 204-222 |
| Number of pages | 19 |
| Journal | Philosophical Issues |
| Volume | 27 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| Early online date | 11 Oct 2017 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 11 Oct 2017 |