Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


    We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)1949-1964
    Issue number6
    Early online date4 Dec 2017
    Publication statusPublished - 4 Dec 2017


    • Bayesian persuasion
    • Information disclosure
    • Information design
    • Mechanism design without transfers
    • Experiments
    • Persuasion mechanism


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