Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Anton Kolotilin; Tymofiy Mylovanov; Andriy Zapechelnyuk; Ming Li

doi:10.3982/ECTA13251

Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

Anton Kolotilin, Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, Ming Li

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	1949-1964
Journal	Econometrica
Volume	85
Issue number	6
Early online date	4 Dec 2017
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.3982/ECTA13251
Publication status	Published - 4 Dec 2017

Keywords

Bayesian persuasion
Information disclosure
Information design
Mechanism design without transfers
Experiments
Persuasion mechanism

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10.3982/ECTA13251

Kolotilin-2017-Persuasion-Economet-AAM
© 2017, The Econometric Society. This work has been made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://doi/org/10.3982/ECTA13251
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author = "Anton Kolotilin and Tymofiy Mylovanov and Andriy Zapechelnyuk and Ming Li",

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AU - Zapechelnyuk, Andriy

AU - Li, Ming

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N2 - We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.

AB - We study persuasion mechanisms in linear environments. A receiver has a private type and chooses between two actions. A sender designs a persuasion mechanism or an experiment to disclose information about a payoff-relevant state. A persuasion mechanism conditions information disclosure on the receiver's report about his type, whereas an experiment discloses information independent of the receiver's type. We establish the equivalence of implementation by persuasion mechanisms and by experiments, and characterize optimal persuasion mechanisms.

KW - Bayesian persuasion

KW - Information disclosure

KW - Information design

KW - Mechanism design without transfers

KW - Experiments

KW - Persuasion mechanism

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Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

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Theoretical Foundations: Theoretical foundations and design of persuasion mechanism

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Persuasion of a privately informed receiver

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Keywords

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Theoretical Foundations: Theoretical foundations and design of persuasion mechanism

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