Perspectival variance and worldly fragmentation

M.A. Lipman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

9 Citations (Scopus)


Objects often manifest themselves in incompatible ways across perspectives that are epistemically on a par. The standard response to such cases is to deny that the properties that things appear to have from different perspectives are properties that things really have out there. This type of response seems worrying: too many properties admit of perspectival variance and there are good theoretical reasons to think that such properties are genuinely instantiated. So, we have reason to explore views on which things can have the incompatible properties they appear to have across perspectives. This paper explores the view that things can have incompatible properties if the world is not a metaphysically unified place but is instead fragmented. There is a sensible notion of co-obtainment, on which two facts can each obtain without co-obtaining. Using this notion, we can step back from our embedded perspectives on the world without deeming the contents of those perspectives to be mere appearances. This renders the sheer pervasiveness of perspectival variance a serious pressure on the standard response, as well as a serious reason to think that the world is indeed fragmented.
Original languageEnglish
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Early online date21 May 2015
Publication statusPublished - 2015


  • Fragmentalism
  • Perspectival facts
  • Secondary properties
  • Co-obtainment
  • Metaphysical relativism
  • Manifest image


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