Perspectival Skeptical Theism

Jonathan Curtis Rutledge

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)
1 Downloads (Pure)


Skeptical theists have paid insufficient attention to non-evidential components of epistemic rationality. I address this lacuna by constructing an alternative perspectivalist understanding of epistemic rationality and defeat that, when applied to skeptical theism, yields a more demanding standard for reasonably affirming the crucial premise of the evidential argument from suffering. The resulting perspectival skeptical theism entails that someone can be justified in believing that gratuitous suffering exists only if they are not subject to closure of inquiry defeat; that is, a type of defeat that prevents reasonable belief that p even if p is very probable on an agent’s evidence.
Original languageEnglish
JournalFaith and Philosophy
VolumeIn press
Early online date1 May 2019
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 1 May 2019


Dive into the research topics of 'Perspectival Skeptical Theism'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this