Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

P  Manzini; M  Mariotti

Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

P Manzini, M Mariotti

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

30 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider an alternating offer bargaining model in which the players may agree to call in an arbitrator in case of disagreement. The main message of our study is that the mere presence of an arbitrator-who can only become active with the consent of both parties-in the background of negotiations may entirely drive their outcome. We compare our results with those obtained in models with outside options. (C) 2001 Academic Press.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	170-195
Number of pages	26
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	37
Issue number	1
Publication status	Published - Oct 2001

Keywords

bargaining
arbitration
outside option
FINAL-OFFER ARBITRATION

Cite this

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Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

Abstract

Keywords

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