Perceptual consciousness and intensional transitive verbs

Justin D'Ambrosio*, Daniel Stoljar

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

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Abstract

There is good reason to think that, in every case of perceptual consciousness, there is something of which we are conscious; but there is also good reason to think that, in some cases of perceptual consciousness—for instance, hallucinations—there is nothing of which we are conscious. This paper resolves this inconsistency—which we call the presentation problem—by (a) arguing that ‘conscious of’ and related expressions function as intensional transitive verbs and (b) defending a particular semantic approach to such verbs, on which they have readings that lack direct objects or themes. The paper further argues that this approach serves not only as a linguistic proposal about the semantics of ‘conscious of’, but also as a proposal about the metaphysics of conscious states.
Original languageEnglish
Number of pages22
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Early online date26 Sept 2023
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - 26 Sept 2023

Keywords

  • Intensional transitive verbs
  • Consciousness
  • Awareness
  • Intensionality
  • Hallucination

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