Original sin, the Fall, and epistemic self-trust

Jonathan Curtis Rutledge

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Citations (Scopus)


In this paper, I argue that no strong doctrine of the Fall can undermine the propriety of epistemic self-trust. My argument proceeds by introducing a common type of philosophical methodology, known as reflective equilibrium. After a brief exposition of the method, I introduce a puzzle for someone engaged in the project of self-reflection after gaining a reason to distrust their epistemic selves on the basis of a construal of a doctrine of the Fall. I close by introducing the worry as a formal argument and demonstrate the self-undermining nature of such an argument.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)84-94
Number of pages10
JournalTheoLogica: An International Journal for Philosophy of Religion and Philosophical Theology
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - 27 Mar 2018


  • Original sin
  • Epistemic self-trust
  • Trust
  • Self-defeat
  • Rationality
  • Epistemic rationality
  • Analytic theology
  • The Fall
  • Noetic Effects of Sin


Dive into the research topics of 'Original sin, the Fall, and epistemic self-trust'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this