Ordering collective performance manipulation practices: how do leaders manipulate financial reporting figures in conglomerates

Francois-Regis Puyou

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    7 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This article explores some of the resources, tactics and skills used by managers involved in the manipulation of performance reporting by looking at management accounting practices in a conglomerate. Prior research on reporting manipulation in large corporations has focused on why executives manipulate figures. The present paper documents how BU leaders compensate for the uncertainties impacting the performance of their activities. Empirical evidence comes from a field study of a diversified French conglomerate. Performance reporting practices within and between a parent company and two subsidiaries are analyzed. The article shows that the conglomerate constitutes a strategic action field (Fligstein and McAdam 2011) where skilful group leaders use the resources granted by their power position to frame other actors’ interests and identities to initiate stable cooperation around manipulation practices. This study clarifies the collective and collaborative dimensions of practices granting greater control over reporting figures.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)469-488
    JournalCritical Perspectives on Accounting
    Volume24
    Issue number6
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 1 Sept 2014

    Keywords

    • Fligstein
    • Management control
    • Performance manipulation
    • Critical
    • Social

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