Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality

Jernej  Čopič; Clara Ponsati Obiols

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008

Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality

Jernej Čopič, Clara Ponsati Obiols

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Abstract

A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	276-287
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	163
Early online date	29 Dec 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008
Publication status	Published - May 2016

Keywords

Bilateral trade
Incomplete information
Mechanism design
Robustness
Efficiency

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10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008

Ponsati_Neutrality_JoET_AM
Copyright © 2015 Published by Elsevier Inc. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008
Accepted author manuscript, 286 KB

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title = "Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality",

abstract = "A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.",

keywords = "Bilateral trade, Incomplete information, Mechanism design, Robustness, Efficiency",

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KW - Bilateral trade

KW - Incomplete information

KW - Mechanism design

KW - Robustness

KW - Efficiency

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DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2015.11.008

M3 - Article

SN - 0022-0531

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SP - 276

EP - 287

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

ER -

Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality

Abstract

Keywords

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