Optimal robust bilateral trade: risk neutrality

Jernej Čopič, Clara Ponsati Obiols

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    A risk neutral seller and buyer with private information bargain over an indivisible item. We prove that optimal robust bilateral trade mechanisms are payoff equivalent to non-wasteful randomized posted prices.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)276-287
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume163
    Early online date29 Dec 2015
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - May 2016

    Keywords

    • Bilateral trade
    • Incomplete information
    • Mechanism design
    • Robustness
    • Efficiency

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