Optimal legal standards for competition policy further re-visited

Yannis Katsoulacos; David Ulph

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109578

Optimal legal standards for competition policy further re-visited

Yannis Katsoulacos^*, David Ulph^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Katsoulacosand Ulph (2009) showed how all the factors identified as being relevant to choosing between a Per Se and an Effects-Basedlegal standard in terms of their decision error costs could be combined into asimple formula for determining which standard to use. Seifert (2020) gives an alternativecharacterisation of an Effects-Based legal standard and shows that itsdecision error costs are never higher than those of Per Se. We argue that nevertheless our originalformula remains valid for choosing between these two legal standards.

Original language	English
Article number	109578
Number of pages	9
Journal	Economics Letters
Volume	196
Early online date	22 Sept 2020
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109578
Publication status	Published - Nov 2020

Keywords

Legal standards
Per Se
Effects-based
Decision errors
Bayesian updating

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10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109578Licence: CC BY-NC-ND

Katsoulacos_2020_EL_Optimal_CC
Copyright ©2020 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Final published version, 322 KBLicence: CC BY-NC-ND

Cite this

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AB - Katsoulacosand Ulph (2009) showed how all the factors identified as being relevant to choosing between a Per Se and an Effects-Basedlegal standard in terms of their decision error costs could be combined into asimple formula for determining which standard to use. Seifert (2020) gives an alternativecharacterisation of an Effects-Based legal standard and shows that itsdecision error costs are never higher than those of Per Se. We argue that nevertheless our originalformula remains valid for choosing between these two legal standards.

KW - Legal standards

KW - Per Se

KW - Effects-based

KW - Decision errors

KW - Bayesian updating

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Optimal legal standards for competition policy further re-visited

Abstract

Keywords

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