Optimal legal standards for competition policy further re-visited

Yannis Katsoulacos*, David Ulph*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    1 Citation (Scopus)
    1 Downloads (Pure)

    Abstract

    Katsoulacosand Ulph (2009) showed how all the factors identified as being relevant to choosing between a Per Se and an Effects-Basedlegal standard in terms of their decision error costs could be combined into asimple formula for determining which standard to use.    Seifert (2020) gives an alternativecharacterisation of an Effects-Based legal standard and shows that itsdecision error costs are never higher than those of Per Se.  We argue that nevertheless our originalformula remains valid for choosing between these two legal standards.

    Original languageEnglish
    Article number109578
    Number of pages9
    JournalEconomics Letters
    Volume196
    Early online date22 Sept 2020
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Nov 2020

    Keywords

    • Legal standards
    • Per Se
    • Effects-based
    • Decision errors
    • Bayesian updating

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Optimal legal standards for competition policy further re-visited'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this