Optimal fees in internet auctions

Alexander Matros; Andriy Zapechelnyuk

doi:10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9

Optimal fees in internet auctions

Alexander Matros^*, Andriy Zapechelnyuk

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	155-163
Number of pages	9
Journal	Review of Economic Design
Volume	12
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9
Publication status	Published - Sept 2008

Keywords

Auction house
Auctions with resale
Closing fee
Internet auctions
Listing fee

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10.1007/s10058-008-0044-9

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abstract = "An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.",

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AB - An auction house runs a second-price auction with a possibility of resale through re-auctions. It collects listing and closing fees from the seller. We find the fees which maximize the revenue of the auction house. In particular, we show that the optimal listing fee is zero. Our findings are consistent with the policies of eBay, Amazon, Yahoo, and other Internet auctions.

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KW - Closing fee

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Optimal fees in internet auctions

Abstract

Keywords

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