Optimal climate change policies when governments cannot commit

David Tregear Ulph, Alistair Ulph

    Research output: Working paper

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    Abstract

    We analyse the optimal design of climate change policies when a government wants to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the relevant carbon taxes (or other environmental policies) that would incentivise such investment by firms will be set in the future. We assume that the current government cannot commit to long-term carbon taxes, and so both it and the private sector face the possibility that the government in power in the future may give different (relative) weight to environmental damage costs. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect: it increases the incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest. Consequently the current government may need to use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required investment.
    Original languageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of St Andrews
    Number of pages15
    Publication statusPublished - 2011

    Publication series

    NameSchool of Economics & Finance Discussion Paper
    PublisherUniversity of St Andrews
    No.1104
    ISSN (Print)0962-4031
    ISSN (Electronic)2055-303X

    Keywords

    • Climate Change
    • Emissions Taxes
    • impact on R&D
    • Timing and commitment

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