On What It is To Be in a Quandary

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Abstract

A number of serious problems are raised against Crispin Wright’s quandary conception of vagueness. Two alternative conceptions of the quandary view are proposed instead. The first conception retains Wright’s thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. However a further problem is seen to beset this conception. The second conception, in response to this further problem, does not enjoin the thesis that, for all one knows, a verdict concerning a borderline case constitutes knowledge. The result is a much simpler and more plausible version of the quandary view.
Original languageEnglish
JournalSynthese
Volume171
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2009

Keywords

  • Ignorance
  • Quandary
  • Indeterminacy
  • Permissible disagreement
  • Vagueness

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