On smiles, winks, and handshakes as coordination devices

Paola Manzini, A Sadrieh, N Vriend

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    23 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In an experimental study we examine a variant of the 'minimum effort game', a coordination game with Pareto ranked equilibria and risk considerations pointing to the least efficient equilibrium. We focus on the question whether simple cues such as smiles, winks and handshakes could be recognised and employed by the players as a tell-tale sign of each other's trustworthiness, thus enabling them to coordinate on the more risky but more rewarding Pareto efficient equilibrium. Our experimental results show that such cues may indeed play a role as coordination devices as their information value is significant and substantial.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)826-854
    Number of pages29
    JournalThe Economic Journal
    Volume119
    Issue number537
    Early online date16 Mar 2009
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2009

    Keywords

    • CHEAP-TALK
    • EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY
    • 1ST IMPRESSIONS
    • GAME-THEORY
    • COMMUNICATION
    • ORGANIZATIONS
    • EQUILIBRIUM
    • EFFICIENCY
    • TRUST
    • FACE

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'On smiles, winks, and handshakes as coordination devices'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this