On Priest on Nonmonotonic and Inductive Logic

Greg Restall*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Graham Priest defends the use of a nonmonotonic logic, LPm, in his analysis of reasoning in the face of true contradictions, such as those arising from the paradoxes of self-reference. In the course of defending this choice of logic in the face of the criticism that this logic is not truth preserving, Priest argued (2012) that requirement is too much to ask: since LPm is a nonmonotonic logic, it necessarily fails to preserve truth. In this article, I show that this assumption is incorrect, and I explain why nonmonotonic logics can nonetheless be truth preserving. Finally, I diagnose Priest's error, to explain when nonmonotonic logics do indeed fail to preserve truth.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)119-124
Number of pages6
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 1 Jun 2016


  • conditionals
  • inductive logic
  • nonmonotonic
  • paraconsistent
  • paradoxes


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