On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions

Yair Tauman; Andriy Zapechelnyuk

doi:10.1007/s00182-009-0196-z

On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions

Yair Tauman, Andriy Zapechelnyuk^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	171-175
Number of pages	5
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	39
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0196-z
Publication status	Published - Mar 2010

Keywords

Aggregate monotonicity
Axiomatic solution
Cooperative games
Core
Nucleolus
Shapley value

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title = "On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions",

abstract = "Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.",

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author = "Yair Tauman and Andriy Zapechelnyuk",

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AB - Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.

KW - Aggregate monotonicity

KW - Axiomatic solution

KW - Cooperative games

KW - Core

KW - Nucleolus

KW - Shapley value

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On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions

Abstract

Keywords

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