On (non-) monotonicity of cooperative solutions

Yair Tauman, Andriy Zapechelnyuk*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    4 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Aggregate monotonicity of cooperative solutions is widely accepted as a desirable property, and examples where certain solution concepts (such as the nucleolus) violate this property are scarce and have no economic interpretation. We provide an example of a simple four-player game that points out at a class of economic contexts where aggregate monotonicity is not appealing.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)171-175
    Number of pages5
    JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
    Volume39
    Issue number1
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Mar 2010

    Keywords

    • Aggregate monotonicity
    • Axiomatic solution
    • Cooperative games
    • Core
    • Nucleolus
    • Shapley value

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