On Fine’s fragmentalism

M.A. Lipman

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

34 Citations (Scopus)


Fragmentalism is the view that reality is not a metaphysically unified place, but fragmented in a certain sense, and constituted by incompatible facts across such fragments. It was introduced by Kit Fine in a discussion of tense realist theories of time (Modality and tense: philosophical papers. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 261–320, 2005). Here I discuss the conceptual foundations of fragmentalism, identify several open questions in Fine’s characterization of the view, and propose an understanding of fragmentalism that addresses these open questions.
Original languageEnglish
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Publication statusPublished - 14 Feb 2015


  • Fragmentalism
  • Tense
  • Incompatible facts
  • Reality
  • Co-obtainment


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