Ockham and Buridan on the ampliation of modal propositions

S. Johnston

doi:10.1080/09608788.2014.986712

Ockham and Buridan on the ampliation of modal propositions

S. Johnston

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This paper explores a currently unnoticed argument used by John Buridan to defend his analysis of modal propositions and to reject the analysis of modal propositions of necessity put forward by William of Ockham. First, I explore this argument and, by considering possible responses of Ockham to Buridan, show some of the ways in which Ockham seems to be keeping closer to Aristotle's remarks about modal propositions in Prior Analytics, 18.

Original language	English
Journal	British Journal for the History of Philosophy
Early online date	30 Jan 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2014.986712
Publication status	Published - 2015

Keywords

John Buridan
William of Ockham
Ampliation
Modality
Supposition

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10.1080/09608788.2014.986712

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KW - Supposition

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Ockham and Buridan on the ampliation of modal propositions

Abstract

Keywords

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