Nudging for judging that p

Oscar A. Piedrahita; Matthew Vermaire

doi:10.1093/pq/pqaf026

Nudging for judging that p

Oscar A. Piedrahita^*, Matthew Vermaire

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Recent work in social epistemology has begun to make use of the behavioral-scientific concept of the nudge, but without sustained attention to how it should be translated from behavioral to epistemic contexts. We offer an account of doxastic nudges that satisfies extensional and theoretical desiderata, defend it against other accounts in the literature, and use it to clarify ongoing discussions of how nudges relate to reason-giving, knowledge, and autonomy.

Original language	English
Article number	pqaf026
Number of pages	22
Journal	Philosophical Quarterly
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqaf026
Publication status	Published - 8 Apr 2025

Keywords

Autonomy
Doxastic nudges
Nudges
Rationality
Reasons

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10.1093/pq/pqaf026

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author = "Piedrahita, {Oscar A.} and Matthew Vermaire",

note = "Funding: This research was supported by the Arts and Humanities Research Council's Expanding Autonomy grant (AH/W005077/1) and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation), project number 498800272.",

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KW - Rationality

KW - Reasons

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Nudging for judging that p

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