Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus

Laure Kuhfuss; Raphaele Preget; Sophie Thoyer; Nick Hanley

doi:10.1093/erae/jbv031

Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus

Laure Kuhfuss^*, Raphaele Preget, Sophie Thoyer, Nick Hanley

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers’ participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others’ participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	609-636
Number of pages	28
Journal	European Review of Agricultural Economics
Volume	43
Issue number	4
Early online date	31 Oct 2015
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbv031
Publication status	Published - Sept 2016

Keywords

Payment for environmental services
Choice experiment
Collective incentive
Social norm
Behavioural economics

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10.1093/erae/jbv031

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© Oxford University Press and Foundation for the European Review of Agricultural Economics 2015; all rights reserved. This work is made available online in accordance with the publisher’s policies. This is the author created, accepted version manuscript following peer review and may differ slightly from the final published version. The final published version of this work is available at https://dx.doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbv031
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Cite this

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title = "Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus",

abstract = "This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers{\textquoteright} participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others{\textquoteright} participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.",

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ER -

Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus

Abstract

Keywords

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