Nudging farmers to enrol land into agri-environmental schemes: the role of a collective bonus

Laure Kuhfuss*, Raphaele Preget, Sophie Thoyer, Nick Hanley

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    73 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers’ participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others’ participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)609-636
    Number of pages28
    JournalEuropean Review of Agricultural Economics
    Volume43
    Issue number4
    Early online date31 Oct 2015
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Sept 2016

    Keywords

    • Payment for environmental services
    • Choice experiment
    • Collective incentive
    • Social norm
    • Behavioural economics

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