Abstract
This article shows that the introduction of a conditional collective bonus in an agri-environmental scheme (AES) can improve farmers’ participation and increase land enrolment for lower overall budgetary costs. This monetary bonus is paid in addition to the usual AES payment if a given threshold is reached in terms of aggregate farmer participation. Using a choice experiment, we estimate the preferences of winegrowers in the South of France for such a bonus. We show that it contributes to increased expectations of farmers on others’ participation, therefore shifting a pro-environmental social norm and favouring the adoption of less pesticide-intensive farming practices.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 609-636 |
Number of pages | 28 |
Journal | European Review of Agricultural Economics |
Volume | 43 |
Issue number | 4 |
Early online date | 31 Oct 2015 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Sept 2016 |
Keywords
- Payment for environmental services
- Choice experiment
- Collective incentive
- Social norm
- Behavioural economics