Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees

Matteo Gamalerio; Margherita Negri

doi:10.1093/jeg/lbad002

Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees

Matteo Gamalerio, Margherita Negri^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees’ reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits arising from these centers. Low electoral competition and high shares of extreme-right voters drive the effect. Our results are rationalized by a theoretical model and can explain the unequal distribution of refugees across and within countries.

Original language	English
Article number	lbad002
Pages (from-to)	901-920
Number of pages	20
Journal	Journal of Economic Geography
Volume	23
Issue number	4
Early online date	20 Feb 2023
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/jeg/lbad002
Publication status	Published - 1 Jul 2023

UN SDGs

This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

SDG 10 Reduced Inequalities
SDG 16 Peace, Justice and Strong Institutions

Keywords

Migration
Reception of refugees
Electoral incentives
Fiscal grants

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10.1093/jeg/lbad002Licence: CC BY

Gamalerio_2023_JEG_Electoralincentives_CC
Copyright © The Author (2023). Published by Oxford University Press. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Final published version, 334 KBLicence: CC BY

Cite this

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KW - Fiscal grants

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Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees

Abstract

UN SDGs

Keywords

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