Nonexistent objects as truth-makers: against Crane's reductionism

Filippo Casati, Naoya Fujikawa

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

According to Meinongianism, some objects do not exist but we can legitimately refer to and quantify over them. Moreover, Meinongianism standardly regards nonexistent objects as contributing to the truth-makers of sentences about nonexistent objects. Recently, Tim Crane has proposed a weak form of Meinongianism, a reductionism, which denies any contribution of nonexistent objects to truth-making. His reductionism claims that, even though we can truly talk about nonexistent objects by using singular terms and quantifiers about them, any truth about nonexistent objects is reducible to some truths about existent objects. In this paper, we critically examine the reductionism casting some doubts on the reducibility of truths of sentences like 'a winged pig is possible' or 'some winged pig does not exist' into truths about existent objects. We also argue that the truth of such sentences can be explained by adopting a strong form of Meinongianism which admits contribution of nonexistent objects to the truth-making of such sentences.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)423-434
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophia
Volume44
Issue number2
Early online date19 Apr 2016
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2016

Keywords

  • Nonexistent objects
  • Truth-maker
  • Meinongianism
  • Possible objects
  • Reductionism

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