No-regret dynamics and fictitious play

Yannick Viossat; Andriy Zapechelnyuk

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.003

No-regret dynamics and fictitious play

Yannick Viossat, Andriy Zapechelnyuk^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	825-842
Number of pages	18
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	148
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.003
Publication status	Published - Mar 2013

Keywords

Best-reply dynamics
Curb set
Fictitious play
Hannan set
Nash equilibrium
No-regret strategy
Regret minimization

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10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.003

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title = "No-regret dynamics and fictitious play",

abstract = "Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.",

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author = "Yannick Viossat and Andriy Zapechelnyuk",

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AB - Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.

KW - Best-reply dynamics

KW - Curb set

KW - Fictitious play

KW - Hannan set

KW - Nash equilibrium

KW - No-regret strategy

KW - Regret minimization

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/84875375293

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DO - 10.1016/j.jet.2012.07.003

M3 - Article

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VL - 148

SP - 825

EP - 842

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 2

ER -

No-regret dynamics and fictitious play

Abstract

Keywords

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