No-regret dynamics and fictitious play

Yannick Viossat, Andriy Zapechelnyuk*

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    34 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Potential based no-regret dynamics are shown to be related to fictitious play. Roughly, these are ε-best reply dynamics where ε is the maximal regret, which vanishes with time. This allows for alternative and sometimes much shorter proofs of known results on convergence of no-regret dynamics to the set of Nash equilibria.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)825-842
    Number of pages18
    JournalJournal of Economic Theory
    Volume148
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Mar 2013

    Keywords

    • Best-reply dynamics
    • Curb set
    • Fictitious play
    • Hannan set
    • Nash equilibrium
    • No-regret strategy
    • Regret minimization

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