Necessary Truth and Proof

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What makes necessary truths true? I argue that all truth supervenes on how
things are, and that necessary truths are no exception. What makes them true are proofs. But if so, the notion of proof needs to be generalized to include verification-transcendent proofs, proofs whose correctness exceeds our ability to verify it. It is incumbent on me, therefore, to show that arguments, such as Dummett's, that verification-truth is not compatible with the theory of meaning, are mistaken. The answer is that what we can conceive and construct far outstrips our actual abilities. I conclude by proposing a proof-theoretic account of modality, rejecting a claim of Armstrong's that modality can reside in non-modal truthmakers.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)47-67
JournalKriterion: Revista de Filosofia
Issue number121
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2010


  • truthmakers
  • proof
  • truth
  • modality


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