Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

M  Mariotti

doi:10.1007/s003550050114

Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

M Mariotti

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Nash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	413-421
Number of pages	9
Journal	Social Choice and Welfare
Volume	15
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s003550050114
Publication status	Published - May 1998

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PREFERENCES
EXTENSION

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title = "Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite",

abstract = "Nash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results.",

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AB - Nash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results.

KW - PREFERENCES

KW - EXTENSION

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U2 - 10.1007/s003550050114

DO - 10.1007/s003550050114

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JO - Social Choice and Welfare

JF - Social Choice and Welfare

IS - 3

ER -

Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

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