Nash bargaining theory when the number of alternatives can be finite

M Mariotti

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    35 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Nash (1950) considered a domain of convex bargaining problems. We analyse domains including, or even consisting of, finite problems and provide various characterisations of the Nash Bargaining Solution (NBS). In particular, we extend Kaneko's (1980) results.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)413-421
    Number of pages9
    JournalSocial Choice and Welfare
    Volume15
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - May 1998

    Keywords

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