Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments

Oliver Kirchkamp, Rosemarie Nagel

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    60 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In this paper we study learning and cooperation in repeated prisoners' dilemmas experiments. We compare interaction neighbourhoods of different size and structure, we observe choices under different information conditions, and we estimate parameters of a learning model.

    We find that naive imitation, although a driving force in many models of spatial evolution, may be negligible in the experiment. Naive imitation predicts more cooperation in spatial structures than in spaceless ones-regardless whether interaction neighbourhoods have the same or different sizes in both structures. We find that with some interaction neighbourhoods even the opposite may hold. (c) 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)269-292
    Number of pages24
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume58
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 2007

    Keywords

    • imitation
    • learning
    • local interaction
    • heterogeneity of environment
    • experiments
    • prisoners' dilemma
    • LOCAL INTERACTION
    • IMITATION
    • EVOLUTION
    • GAMES
    • COORDINATION
    • COMPETITION
    • BEHAVIOR
    • STRATEGY
    • MARKETS
    • OTHERS

    Fingerprint

    Dive into the research topics of 'Naive learning and cooperation in network experiments'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

    Cite this