Myanmar 2024: whose tide has turned?

This article highlights the multi-scalar politics of Myanmar, where regional politics and geopolitics interact with and compound national and local issues and conflicts. The first part of 2024 confirmed the trends of the previous year. Ethnic armed organizations (EAOs), in coalition or individually, capitalized on the momentum offered by Operation 1027 with the members of the 3 Brotherhood Alliance gaining ground in Rakhine and Shan States, until a China-brokered ceasefire in January formalized a military withdrawal from key towns and strategic roads. The same groups embarked on ‘Part II’ of Operation 1027 in late June and July, making additional important gains, as evidenced by the capture of the strategic town of Lashio in Shan State and additional territorial gains by the Arakan Army (AA) in Rakhine State. The AA expanded its control of the State further and by the end of the year it had expelled the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF, the junta’s military) from most of the state. The junta appeared incapable of taking the strategic or even operational initiative and was under attack from all fronts. It lost control of most of its land borders. Perhaps for the first time since independence, it became possible to think of a defeat of the Myanmar military. And yet, over the summer, the anti-military tide in Shan State came to a halt. Feeling that some EAOs had simply gone «too far» and that a collapse of the junta and – by extension – of the state was conceivable, China changed its policy, extending greater support to the junta and withdrawing support from some of its closest EAOs, even arresting its leaders on Chinese territory. Inter-EAO conflicts ensued in Shan State, favouring the military’s position there. Throughout the year, the regime remained embattled, suffering a growing number of defeats, but was not on the verge of imminent collapse.