Multiperson bargaining over two alternatives

C Ponsati*, J Sakovics

*Corresponding author for this work

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    11 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    We present a continuous-time model of multiperson bargaining with incomplete information, where only two agreements are possible. We show that under mild informational assumptions, players behave as if they were representing the other players who prefer the same alternative, individually playing a war-of-attrition against a conglomerate player of the opposite side. We also provide a characterization of the perfect Bayesian equilibria in undominated strategies of the game, which yields a unique outcome in most cases. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)226-244
    Number of pages19
    JournalGames and Economic Behavior
    Volume12
    Issue number2
    Publication statusPublished - Feb 1996

    Keywords

    • UNIQUE PERFECT EQUILIBRIUM
    • GAME

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