Moral fictionalism versus the rest

Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall, Caroline West

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

60 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we introduce a distinct metaethical position, fictionalism about morality. We clarify and defend the position, showing that it is a way to save the 'moral phenomena' while agreeing that there is no genuine objective prescriptivity to be described by moral terms. In particular, we distinguish moral fictionalism from moral quasi-realism, and we show that fictionalism possesses the virtues of quasi-realism about morality, but avoids its vices.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)307-330
Number of pages24
JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
Volume83
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sept 2005

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