Modality, truth and mere picture thinking

Christopher Masterman

doi:10.1007/s11229-024-04840-4

Modality, truth and mere picture thinking

Christopher Masterman^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

Many draw the distinction between truth in, and truth at, a possible world. The latter notion purportedly allows for propositions to be true relative to worlds even if they do not exist relative to those same worlds. Despite its wide application, the distinction is controversial. Some think that the notion of truth at a world is unintelligible. Here, I outline and discuss the most influential argument for the unintelligibility of truth at a world, The Picture Thinking Argument. I outline and defend a neglected strategy to respond to this, arguing that if we take seriously the idea that possible worlds represent total ways the world could be, the distinction can be drawn intelligibly.

Original language	English
Article number	27
Number of pages	17
Journal	Synthese
Volume	205
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04840-4
Publication status	Published - 9 Jan 2025

Keywords

World-relative truth
Possible worlds
Propositions
Propositional contingentism
Modality

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Cite this

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Modality, truth and mere picture thinking

Abstract

Keywords

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