Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership

Manfredi M A La Manna; K George

Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership

Manfredi M A La Manna
, K George

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is ''small''.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	853-860
Number of pages	8
Journal	Review of Industrial Organization
Volume	11
Publication status	Published - Dec 1996

Keywords

mixed oligopoly
public ownership
privatization

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title = "Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership",

abstract = "If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is ''small''.",

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AU - George, K

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N2 - If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is ''small''.

AB - If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is ''small''.

KW - mixed oligopoly

KW - public ownership

KW - privatization

UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/0001362859

M3 - Article

SN - 0889-938X

VL - 11

SP - 853

EP - 860

JO - Review of Industrial Organization

JF - Review of Industrial Organization

ER -

Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership

Abstract

Keywords

Handle.net

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