Mixed duopoly, inefficiency, and public ownership

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    42 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    If a publicly-owned firm has a higher marginal cost than a private firm, partial public ownership may be welfare-improving, if the public firm acts is Stackelberg leader. If the private firm's marginal cost is private information a simple transfer function is truth-eliciting. If the stock market is efficient, the cost of renationalization is ''small''.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)853-860
    Number of pages8
    JournalReview of Industrial Organization
    Volume11
    Publication statusPublished - Dec 1996

    Keywords

    • mixed oligopoly
    • public ownership
    • privatization

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