Minogue and the end of conservatism

The heyday of conservative intellectual activity in Britain lay between the appearance in 1978 of Conservative Essays edited by Maurice Cowling and the publication in 1996 of Conservative Realism: New Essays in Conservatism edited by Kenneth Minogue. For the most part, these collections represent two understandings of conservatism: the first more oriented towards cultural and social traditionalism, the second directed to the critique of leftist ideologies and the advancement of individualism and freedom. These differences touch on deep issues about the nature, credentials, range, and aims of conservatism and its relation to political theory and practice. This essay explores some of these via an examination of the thought of Kenneth Minogue, a student and then colleague of Michael Oakshott at the London School of Economics, a supporter and friend of Margaret Thatcher, and a dedicated opponent of what he termed “ideology.” The roots of his thought about politics lie in the work of Oakeshott who argues that the role of theory is to interpret various spheres or “modes” of experience, and not to apply itself to action within those spheres. In line with this, Minogue treats political philosophies in the ordinary sense as forms of ideology. For Minogue, however, ideology has a narrower sense relating to theories that claim to reveal forms of social oppression and argue for action to overthrow these. His attack on ideologies (which he sees as including certain forms of conservatism) is connected with his advocacy of individualism and liberty. This paper explores these various issues claiming that this way of thinking rests on misconceptions of the nature of philosophy, and that far from eschewing philosophical support, conservatism should be seeking it out.